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Abstract: The traditional view of the economic agent is of an individual who is self-
interested, rational and perceives the world “correctly”. However, there is a lot of 
experimental and other evidence that undermines this view of agents. It is argued that an 
attempt to model these agents properly requires the cognitive science idea of a mental 
representation- a mental state with content.  It is shown that this idea gives economists 
resources to discuss critiques of economics by Sandel (2012) and Grant (2012). In particular, 
it allows us to think clearly about the notion of goods being “corrupted” by a change in 
context from a non-market to a market situation. 
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 1) Introduction 
One of the great prejudices of modern neoclassical economics has been the belief in 
the universality of self-interested rational choice as a method by which one can make 
behavioural and moral judgements about how people choose. This has led to a peculiar bias 
against the notion that agents can perceive the same situation in different ways and come to 
different behavioural and moral conclusions.  I will argue in this paper that the conventional 
theory has prevented economics from fully embracing the cognitive revolution in the 
behavioural sciences that may cast light on these issues. Furthermore, incorporating cognitive 
elements gives us resources to intelligently discuss some recent attacks on fundamental 
economic concepts from outside the discipline. In particular we will discuss criticisms that 
focus on the inability of economics to model changes in the attitudes of agents. 
The aim of this paper is not to provide a defence against such attacks but to argue that 
we need to import concepts from cognitive science to properly discuss these criticisms. In 
particular, I will argue that we need to incorporate the notion of a mental representation into 
our modelling framework. A mental representation is an interpretation of the world held 
internally by a human being. This is an analogy used in cognitive science to representations 
held by information processing devices such as computers  It will be demonstrated that, given 
the existence of our commonly- accepted ideas of how humans behave, we must accept the 
existence and importance of representations. I will then argue that representations are useful 
in untangling some of the issues in the above-mentioned critiques of economics and that they 
perform better than other possible methods. 
Mental representations are a central part of the cognitive model of the human mind. 
This picture of the mind is that of the mind as a computer with inputs, data storage, 
processing and outputs. In this view of how the mind operates it is necessary to have entities 
that store data and which can be operated on by processing units. Mental representations 
fulfil this role within the human mind, while bytes do the same within computers (Fodor 
1987). This paper advocates the use of this model of the human mind within economic 
reasoning. 
This contrasts sharply with the “economic tradition” which lasted between the 1930s 
and the 1980s which tried to exclude psychological considerations from economic theory (see 
Bruni and Sugden 2007). The founders of marginal analysis such as Jevons and Edgworth 
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explicitly used psychological foundations for their ideas and tried to base their principles on 
what were then seen as the most modern ideas in psychology. However, Pareto in the 1930s 
effectively dismantled this link between economics and psychology by arguing that 
economics should be a science of logical action and that psychology is not necessary for 
economic theorising. Pareto’s arguments won through and became commonplace within 
economics until the 1980s. One side effect of this, when the cognitive revolution emerged in 
the 1960s, was the ignoring of many of the concepts of cognitive science, including 
representations, in favour of rational choice based methods. 
Despite the recent behavioural turn in economics, much of the theoretical research has 
focussed on creating modifications to the current theory. In ideas on social preferences, for 
example, the utility function tends to be modified to take account of these social preferences 
(e.g. Rabin 1993, Fehr & Schmidt 1999). When looking at preference consistency, 
modifications are made to the belief and desire functions (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
This paper will focus on issues relating to changes in attitude and will suggest that the 
introduction of mental representations (or just “representations” from now on) allows a much 
easier way of dealing with such problems than other methods, as well as bringing economics 
more in line with modern cognitive science. 
It should be noted that throughout this paper it will be assumed that preferences may 
be social or self-interested preferences. The ideas expressed here apply to both types of 
preference and do not make any real distinction. It is assumed that agents will tend to behave 
in a self-interested or social way depending on the reasons that they have for acting in one 
way or another (in a manner to be explained). Given the wide range of experimental and 
theoretical papers that have been published asserting and experimentally justifying the 
existence of social preferences (see for example Fehr & Gachter 2000), I will not give a 
justification for this assumption. 
 
2) Corruption of goods 
The issue that we will focus on in this article, and which we will use as a starting 
point for our explanation of the role of representations, comes from the notion that goods can 
be corrupted by being handled in a different institutional setting from where they originated. 
This forms the basis for critiques of marketisation and the use of incentives by the 
philosophers Michael Sandel (2012- reviewed by Besley 2013) and Ruth Grant (2012). The 
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principal idea is that goods, by being bought and sold in a market or by being “bought” 
through an incentive, essentially change their nature and lose value (in the general, non-price 
sense) as a result of this2. This is not a novel idea since it goes back to Albert Hirsch’s 
(Hirsch 1977) ideas on the social limits to growth.  
To put this in context, we will give examples from Sandel and Grant, then look at 
potential explanations for the corruption of goods and ask if they hold up under scrutiny. 
Sandel’s first example is the notion of a gift- why are gifts in Western countries usually given 
in kind rather than in monetary form? As Sandel points out, money is a better gift because it 
is fungible- it can be used by the recipient to buy whatever they want. However, a money gift 
is usually disliked in Western culture because it is seen as demonstrating a lack of care and 
attention by the giver. By converting gift-giving into a simple monetary transaction one is 
undermining the whole value of the gift. A more extreme example is that of friendship- one 
cannot buy friendship because a bought friend is simply not a friend at all. 
Another example is that of paying students to learn by giving them a monetary 
incentive to achieve high grades. The main argument in favour of this is, of course, to 
improve educational outcomes. There are a variety of arguments against it. One of the main 
arguments is the so-called crowding out argument: the monetary extrinsic motivation crowds 
out any intrinsic motivation. Essentially education is no longer being desired for its intrinsic 
merits but for monetary outcomes. There is a large literature on this (See Bowles & Polania 
Reyes 2012 for a review) but, in essence, the outcome is that the nature of the good changes 
when making it into a marketable good. Instead of being something done for its own sake, 
education becomes a good that is traded for money. 
A more extreme example is that of bribery. Bribery is the use of incentives in order to 
achieve an outcome favourable to the briber. An example would be to bribe a judge to let a 
person have a reduced sentence. As Grant points out, this actually satisfies most of the 
conventional moral strictures of modern economics- bribes are non-coercive and increase 
welfare for both briber and recipient (assuming that they are not caught). In strict economic 
terms, there is an increase in welfare. The objection comes from elsewhere: bribery 
undermines the norm of justice that a judge is supposed to enforce. If justice is bought and 
sold then its value as a fair means of punishing crime or resolving disputes is destroyed. 
2 It should be noted that both Sandel and Grant have wide ranging critiques of economic methods of which the 
notion of corruption of goods is only part.  
4 
 
                                                          
An example from Sandel comes from a study by Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1996) 
relating to a referendum in 1993 on whether or not to have a nuclear waste repository near to 
the village of Wolfenschiessen in Switzerland. In a study prior to the referendum, the 
villagers were given a survey on whether they would vote to accept the nuclear waste 
repository or not. The bulk of residents indicated that they would accept it. In a subsequent 
survey the villagers were asked the same question and offered an incentive of an annual 
monetary payment to accept the depository.  
On a pure economics point of view, one would have expected the incentives to 
reinforce the altruistic attitude shown by the villagers but surprisingly, the villagers 
substantially rejected the offer. In this case it is argued, civic duty is simply corrupted by the 
offer of an incentive by converting it into a market transaction. The value of accepting the 
good because one was fulfilling one’s public duty was undermined by offering the incentive. 
The final example relates to the provision of an exit option. Quite often economists 
believe that if people disapprove of a particular arrangement for providing a good then they 
can express their disapproval by exiting from that market. As a result of this, if they stay in 
the market then they implicitly approve of any changes made. It follows that if people do tend 
to stay in the market then the good in question has not been corrupted as long as they have an 
exit option available and they have not used it. However, as Peter (2004) points out, this is to 
confuse choice with consent. One can have a low opinion of a particular way of distributing a 
good without wanting to exit from the distribution of the good. 
An example of the above may be seen in the provision of health services in the UK’s 
National Health Service. Over the past twenty years there has been an increased tendency for 
NHS services to be provided by private providers. This, it is claimed, reduces costs for the 
NHS and, since it is funded by tax-payers who also form the bulk of its users and the voting 
population, this would seem to be beneficial3. However, this has been met by hostility from 
many quarters in spite of this. Nevertheless, most people who have the necessary money have 
not tried to opt out of the system and go on to another method of providing healthcare.  
This paper will accept the interpretation put on these cases by Sandel and Grant as 
being valid. It will be granted that these are examples of the corruption of the goods or 
services and the norms underlying them. Rather than debating them, we will instead focus on 
3 This is working on the assumption that these changes are cost reducing while maintaining the same level of 
service. 
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how this corruption and the reaction to it can be modelled within economics. In other words, 
the aim of this paper will be to find a proper analysis of the corruption of goods as a 
preliminary stage towards a meaningful discussion of the idea. 
 
3) Alternative theories of corruption of goods 
In this section we will examine some possible alternative ideas for the corruption of 
goods to see whether they are sufficient to explain the phenomenon. One set of explanations 
that can be eliminated immediately is a “type” based explanation derived from Harsanyi 
(1967, 1968a, 1968b). The type based explanation would split people into two types 
depending on whether they viewed goods as being market based or non-market based. 
However, it is hard to see how we could move on from here as the point is that individuals 
change their minds about a good and are not of a fixed type as chosen by nature. Given that 
types are set by nature the reason why goods can change nature in the perception of agents is 
highly obscure. Many of the examples given above simply would not work if agents had 
fixed types. 
A more promising line of enquiry would seek to model corruption of goods as a 
change within the good itself. This was the case with Hirsch who postulated an extension of 
Lancaster’s idea (Lancaster 1966) that goods are consumed for the sake of their 
characteristics rather than for being goods themselves. Under this model, there is a 
consumption technology that converts the consumption of goods into characteristics that the 
consumer wants. Utility, therefore, represents preferences over characteristics rather than 
goods. Hirsch postulated that this could be extended to include social norms and the 
environmental conditions under which they are used. In such a case, the corruption of a good 
would take place when these social norms were undermined or when the environment of a 
good is changed. 
A similar, if more radical, version of this idea can be derived from the famous paper 
by Stigler and Becker (1977). Stigler and Becker were not concerned with the corruption of 
goods but rather with how to model seeming changes in tastes or preferences. Their argument 
was to insist that tastes should be modelled as remaining constant while all changes should be 
the result of changes in shadow prices. However, one can see an application of their argument 
to modelling corruption of goods. One way in which corruption of a good could be modelled 
would be as a change in taste with respect to that good. Since this involves a change in tastes, 
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which is unacceptable in modelling terms, it should instead be modelled as a change in a term 
within the utility function or, rather, a change in a term within the production function of each 
“commodity” within the utility function. A “commodity” in this case is actually a construct 
including all possible variables that could influence one’s utility. This includes the original 
good, the alternatives to that good plus human capital goods related to it as well as other 
variables. The utility function itself does not change but variables within the “commodity” do 
change. 
Stigler and Becker’s own chosen variable for changes in the commodity production 
function, human capital, is not much use in this case as there is the possibility that a person 
may change their mind back to their original formulation. This would imply that acquired 
human capital is actually lost or forgotten. However, Stigler and Becker do allow for the 
possibility for other inputs influencing their commodity production function so this is not 
fatal for the application of their theory.  
Cowen (1989) has pointed out that the refusal of Stigler and Becker to allow a given 
utility function to change simply pushes the change back into the commodity production 
function or, if that is constant, into explaining exactly why one of the variables in the 
commodity production function varies. Stigler and Becker provide no explanation for this 
change. To do so would require specifying a function to explain the change in variables as 
well as the commodity production function. This would provide an over-complex explanation 
for a change in attitudes. 
A final possibility is in the use of non-standard utility functions as done by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) and others. In this case the utility of a good is explicitly influenced by the 
impact on other people and by social norms etc. All of these are explicit in the utility function 
rather than being a type of “commodity” as with Stigler and Becker. This method may seem 
to be an improvement over the latter approach since it does incorporate factors which they 
ignore and it does allow for changes in taste. 
However, there are problems with this viewpoint. We can see this by looking at Fehr 
and Schmidt’s revised utility function for two players i,j: 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 −∝𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 0� − 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 0� 
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Where xi and xj are the payoffs for agents i and j  and it is assumed that βi ≤ αi.  This 
utility function generates the utility gained by an individual in one specific situation. This 
varies as the payoffs increase or decrease for the individual or his opponent. However, as it 
stands this is not a good model for corruption of a good. For an individual to go from being 
inequity averse to purely payoff- oriented, for example, would (in general) require a change 
in the values of the parameters such that βi = αi=0. However, this is not explained by the 
model presented here- it is merely an externally imposed change in parameters. 
One could also argue that any change in attitude will involve the addition of extra 
payoff values, changes in parameters and/or extra parameters to any given utility function 
whether self-interested or otherwise. This is because such a change in attitude requires at 
least two possible utility levels. This can only be achieved by shifting a parameter within the 
utility function to change from one utility to another. However, the addition of extra 
parameters that need explaining suggests that in many situations this may not be 
explanatorily efficient. This, of course, also ties in with the critique of Stigler and Becker 
offered by Cowen in that the change in Stigler and Becker’s commodity production function 
is also unexplained. Similarly, Hirsch’s adaptation of Lancaster suffers from the same 
problem in that the crumbling of the social norm supporting a good is likewise not explained. 
This is particularly the case if, as we will explain in more depth later in the paper, the 
attitudes are actually discrete from each other. In other words, there may be a jump from one 
situation where a person is being inequity averse to another situation where that person is 
being self-interested. In such a situation, it would be more efficient to take account of this 
discreteness by simply imposing the utility numbers in the different situations rather than 
creating a complex function to account for the attitudes and shifts in attitudes. The latter 
course of action would have too many unexplained parameters and exogenous shifts in those 
parameters. 
 
4) Representations, attitudes and actions 
One of the more important reasons for reviewing the way in which attitudes are 
modelled in economics is that many of the theories in the previous section simply locate the 
change in attitudes as a property of outcomes. In the case of Hirsch, as well as Stigler and 
Becker, there is an attempt to identify changes in attitudes in changes in the properties of 
goods. I would argue that this tactic is hopeless since attitudes are not located in goods at all. 
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Attitudes are human mental states and are not in any sense properties of the goods 
themselves. In trying to incorporate differing attitudes into the goods themselves, these 
authors are simply not using natural categories of the world. 
The modified utility approach is better since it does acknowledge that human desires 
and beliefs (or “tastes”) do change. However changes tend to be driven by parameters that are 
expressed as constants. These constants have not been investigated in the sense that they do 
not seem to correspond to any valid and reliable psychological measure. Furthermore, there 
seems to be a danger of an infinite regress with parameters being explained by further 
unexplained parameters ad infinitum. If a shift in utility is explained by a shift in parameters 
then something is needed to explain why these parameters shifted. This requires further 
parameters to shift in further explanatory functions4. Finally, this approach seems to ignore 
the role of humans as active thinking beings, able to make judgements about different 
contexts. 
In order to think seriously about what it means to take an action, how people choose 
one action over another and why they choose to take actions we need to analyse action from 
the point of view of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The seminal paper on action 
in philosophy of mind is that of Davidson (1963). According to Davidson, intentional actions 
are caused by reasons, with the reason triggering the action by the human being. Reasons in 
turn can be split into two parts- a belief component and a desire component. So far this fits in 
fairly well with conventional expected utility theory with beliefs being measured by 
(subjective) probabilities and desires being measured by utilities5,6.  
The next stage of the argument is due to Fodor (1987) who highlighted the ubiquity of 
so-called folk psychology in our reasoning. Folk psychology is the tendency to attribute an 
action by another person to mental states in that person. In other words, if a person carries out 
an intentional action then we tend to believe that it is because they have a reason to do it. If 
this is correct then we have to accept that there is a mental state behind every action which is 
a psychological disposition towards a specific content.  So, for example, if a person playing 
cricket swings his bat to hit a ball then onlookers assume that this is intentional and that he is 
4 One general methodological point here is the application of Ockham’s razor: Entities must not be multiplied 
beyond necessity. By stipulating multiple mysterious parameters one is simply failing to explain anything. 
5 The intentional part is important here. If an action is unintentional then there is not necessarily any reason 
attached to it. This would be the case if someone did something accidentally. 
6 In this paper I will ignore any issues associated with measurement of preferences. 
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attempting to score runs. The psychological disposition here is the determination of the player 
to score runs, while the content is the concept of scoring runs. 
Any mental state that has content is a representation and it is Fodor’s main contention 
that any intentional causation of an action must be accompanied by an explicit representation 
in the mind. As Fodor points out, this links in very closely with the cognitive picture of the 
mind. The cognitive picture of the mind makes a close analogy between the human mind and 
a computer. In order for a computer to operate, it needs a representation of the data from the 
external world for purposes of storage and processing. A human mind, by this analogy, 
requires exactly the same thing. Fodor notes that this analogy is probably the only one 
available and it is the one that fits in best with the folk psychological picture. 
Fodor tends to restrict the notion of representations to beliefs on the grounds that 
representations are about content and that content tends to be about what is the case. However 
Smith (1987) has pointed out that one need not restrict representations so tightly since content 
could be about how the world should be rather than just about how it is. In other words, one 
could be motivated to an action by one’s goals, which would involve rearranging the world to 
fit what one wants to happen. In order to do this, one would need a representation of one’s 
goals and desires.  
This all suggests that intentional actions are caused by reasons which split up into 
beliefs and desires as Davidson claims and this can be modelled by expected utility theory. 
However, we can go further and posit that our reasons for actions are bound up in mental 
representations that include both belief elements that show the world as it is and desire 
elements that represent the world as one wants it to be. We can go further with the belief side 
of representations. Rips (1994) points out that the reasoning process amounts to a causal 
interaction between belief- based representations. Insofar as the contents of representations 
consist of mental symbols or a “language of thought” then we can see this as being a logical 
process resulting from the syntax of the symbols in representations. 
This idea of a reason-based choice has been picked up by Shafir et al (1993) who do 
not explicitly claim that choices have their roots in representations but simply that reason-
based choice is a different way of modelling choice from value- based choice theories such as 
expected utility. The claim here is that the two can be modelled together and there is no need 
to distinguish between them. However some of the things that Shafir et. al claim do make 
sense here. For example, the use of representations and reasoning does allow us to deal better 
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with framing effects since the representation simply represents the external world and the 
reasons for a choice can be seen in how it is interpreted. A framing effect can simply be seen 
as a “guided” interpretation of the external world in a representation. 
A human being can potentially entertain a wide variety of representations, including 
many different representations of the same situation. We will assume that, given a choice set 
comprising a given number of possible actions, we can amalgamate the representations of 
each feasible action together into one consistent representation for the choice set. We will 
make two assumptions to support this: 
Common Interpretation of Content: Within the constraints of bounded rationality, 
all relevant external events relating to the choice set must be interpreted into representational 
content in the same way. 
Minimal Rationality: Within the constraints of bounded rationality, all reasons given 
for each action within the choice set must be logically consistent with the reasons given for 
every other action within the choice set. 
Both of these follow from the general psychological desire for consistency and to 
avoid explicit contradictions in one’s reasoning (Rips 1994).  Note that both of them 
explicitly take account of bounded rationality. In other words humans lack processing power 
and knowledge and so may not be able to recognise some inconsistencies. 
We can give examples for each of these assumptions in order to motivate them. 
Common interpretation of content simply states that one cannot use different interpretative 
frameworks within a representation. So, for example, it would be illegitimate to refuse to eat 
pork because one is a Muslim but also refuse to eat beef because one is a Hindu. These are 
distinct religious practices that preclude a person belonging to both of them. They also 
prevent people using both when reasoning about a given decision since they insist on 
different ways of interpreting the world. 
Minimal rationality refers to the rationality of the content of the representations rather 
than the interpretive framework. A simple example is in the choice of fruit. One can give 
one’s reason for choosing an apple as being because one likes apples. However, it would not 
then be consistent to reject choosing a pear because one did not like fruit. It follows that a 
representation over a choice set will be internally consistent and share a common 
interpretation of the external world. From now on, when we refer to “representations” we will 
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refer to representations over whole choice sets that abide by these consistency criteria and if 
we want to refer to content associated with individual actions we will simply refer to them as 
“reasons”. 
A given choice set may have a variety of different possible representations giving 
different reasons for taking one action or another. This is quite consistent with a wide variety 
of psychological research. Simply by taking notice of different cues or by believing certain 
things to be more important than others, one can come to very different conclusions about a 
given situation. We will assume, therefore, that humans can entertain a wide variety of 
different representations over a given choice set. Such ideas have been discussed in 
economics by Amartya Sen in papers on description (Sen 1980) and positional objectivity 
(Sen 1993). 
Since we will be looking at applying this notion of representations to game theory we 
will need to define the equivalent of a choice set in a game. We will call this a base game. A 
base game is a game structure G=<P,S,Q> where P is the set of n players, S is an n-tuple of 
pure strategy sets (one for each player) and Q is a set of outcomes. A base game has no 
explicitly defined payoffs but only outcomes specifying the event that occurs. The players’ 
preferences over the outcomes are not defined within the base game. Instead, representations 
provide the preferences for the base game, creating a new, conventional, game every time a 
representation is applied.  
   
5) The Importance of Representations 
Having established the necessity for accepting representations, one is entitled to ask 
why this is important. Why has this never been deemed to be important before? In order to 
establish importance, we will need to tie representations more tightly to the traditional theory 
of choice. Representations have as content the reasons for making a choice that include both 
belief and desire elements. It follows that, for a given representation over a choice set, one 
would expect these belief and desire elements to be measured by probabilities and utilities 
respectively. Each action in the choice set would result in a number of possible outcomes, 
each weighted by a subjective probability of that outcome occurring. The outcomes would be 
in turn measured in terms of the decision maker’s preference over other possible outcomes by 
a utility index. 
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It follows that a representation can be interpreted as an allocation of expected utilities 
to a choice set or base game. This may seem trivial since expected utilities are allocated to 
choice sets and games all the time. However, it should be noticed that, unlike conventional 
decision theory, there is more than one possible representation for each choice set or base 
game. It may be possible for the same choice set to have completely different allocations of 
utilities according to the representation selected. It should be noted, as will be discussed later, 
that the actual judging of utilities does not happen merely because one has a particular 
representation but rather through the process of selection of representations. 
It can be seen now why the notion of representations is important and why it has not 
been used before. Until the last thirty years in economics it was generally assumed that 
individual agents interpreted the world in the same, correct, way i.e. that the world was 
“description invariant” and could be described in just one way. This generally meant that 
there was no scope for individual interpretation. In addition, the assumption of self interest in 
economics has generally stopped any consideration of changes in attitude by the agent. These 
two factors has reduced the scope of using representations to insignificance. It is only with 
the acceptance that individuals may vary in both their interpretations of the world and in their 
attitudes that representations become important. 
 
6) The Selection of Representations 
One question that remains is how one representation is selected over another. How is 
it that one comes to allocate one set of utilities to outcomes in a choice set or base game 
rather than another? Call the representation that is actually used to allocate the utilities in a 
choice set or base game the active representation. One issue that must be tackled is the 
principle of minimal rationality. This applies within a representation but not necessarily 
across representations even if these representations apply to the same choice set. In order to 
maintain consistency, one would not hold two contradictory representations at one time. It 
follows that a reasonable human being will, in general, not have two active representations at 
one time and if they are aware of more than one such representation then they must make a 
choice between them. 
Another issue is how many representations will be available for selection as the active 
representation. At first it might be thought that this is an impossible task to decide. There are, 
potentially, an infinite number of ways in which one can interpret a particular situation and 
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one might be tempted to say that we are only constrained by our imagination. However, there 
are a variety of practical constraints. Firstly, we are boundedly rational with limited time for 
formulating alternative representations in our mind. Our attention time is rationed and we 
have limited processing time for some of the more complex ideas. Secondly, we tend to look 
to other people for many of our ideas and we tend to adopt representations that have been 
formulated elsewhere. These tend to be limited in number because they have to be easily 
transmitted between individuals (see Sperber 1996 for a detailed analysis of this). Thirdly, the 
minimal rationality constraint imposes minimal standards of consistency that must be adhered 
to by any representation. Finally, representations have to make sense in terms of one’s own 
experience and knowledge. Given this, as was mentioned earlier, one would expect 
representations to be discrete from each other. Changing a variable in a representation 
arbitrarily may make the whole representation incoherent either internally or with the external 
world. Within these constraints it is likely that the number of representations available for 
choosing will be comparatively small. 
The question, then, is how this selection is made. The proposal that I wish to make in 
this paper is that this selection is the result of an autonomous choice made by the agent. In 
other words, representations are chosen in much the same way that one chooses goods. While 
there are some restrictions on how we can model these choices, I believe that there is no 
intrinsic problem with this method. Human beings are self-aware and are able to analyse their 
own beliefs and desires to see whether they fit into a given situation. In the process of this 
analysis they need to make a judgement as to which representation best fits the situation and 
to choose between those representations that are available.  
I would contend that this is not an unusual way of thinking. Whenever we go into a 
new situation we are always looking for clues as to how we should behave and also what sort 
of situation it is. If we visit a foreign country we try to find out and understand the social 
structures, institutions and mores of that country. We then try to find the best way of 
behaving and do our best to conform to it. An extreme version of this is shown in the Asche 
experiments (Asche 1940) where it was demonstrated that conformity could force subjects in 
experiments to make basic misjudgements about line lengths. This happened because, apart 
from one real subject in each experimental session, all the other subjects were confederates 
who were instructed to make the same obvious mistakes. Even if we do not endorse the full 
conformist interpretation, it must be obvious that subjects in Asch’s experiments must have 
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been taking into account what the other (supposed) subjects were doing and analysing the 
situation to make their own decision. 
In order to understand this we need tools to explain what is going on. One useful 
concept is that of a mental action (Proust 2001, Geach 1957, O’Brien & Soteriou 2009)7. A 
mental action is an intentional action by the mind that has as its goal another mental process. 
Examples of this are easy to find. A person tries to remember where his keys are. A student 
tries to concentrate in a lecture. An electrician tries to work out the course of electric wiring 
in a wall. In all these cases nothing physical is happening but in each case the processes have 
goals that are intentional and are not the result of unconscious thought. If, for example, a 
person succeeds in remembering where his keys are then the action has been successful but 
not otherwise. 
Given that mental actions resemble ordinary physical actions, they share the attributes 
of physical actions. Since they are intentional then they are caused by reasons comprising 
beliefs and desires and, given our use of the expected utility model, these can be measured 
using probabilities and utilities respectively. The mental action that we are interested in is 
that of the mind fitting a particular representation to the situation in which the agent finds 
themselves (Proust 2009). This “checking procedure” inside the mind is not solely related to 
correspondence between the beliefs in representations and the external world. Since accuracy 
is valued by most people (see Williams 2002) this would also be incorporated in one’s 
desires. It can also involve wishful thinking whereby one’s desires influence how one 
perceives the world8.  One could, therefore, have expected utilities attached to the action of 
checking representations which are higher depending on how closely they are perceived to 
correspond to the external world and, in the case of wishful thinking, how much one would 
like them to correspond to the external world.  
Precisely how this checking mechanism works or can be conceptualised is under 
dispute. However, for our purposes, it is obvious that comparisons can be made between the 
different checking actions to see which representation corresponds closest to the external 
world and then this can be chosen as the active representation. What we have, therefore, is a 
two-stage decision process. In the first stage a representation is chosen in the mind and then, 
given the representation, a choice is made from the choice set or base game. The mental 
7 I fact the notion of a mental action as described here was first implicitly described by Locke (1689) 
8 One could argue that if one’s representation involves normative elements then a desire element cannot be 
avoided. 
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actions will have a representation corresponding to them which gives reasons for thinking 
that one representation is a better fit to the world than the others and which implicitly assigns 
expected utilities to these outcomes. 
One result of this unified decision process is that one can model the whole procedure 
as a two- stage decision tree or, with more than one player, an extensive form game. The 
utility payoffs at the end of the tree will be the aggregated payoffs both from choices in the 
choice sets and also from the choice between representations. It should be noted that this is a 
purely measurement procedure. The expected utility values in the choice set are assigned 
given the particular representation that is chosen so the fact that representations may 
contradict each other does not prevent utilities being assigned or being comparable across 
representations. All that is required is that the utilities are measured on the same scale. 
The dual character of these utilities deserves to be emphasised because they will 
prove to be useful in the examples at the end of the paper. The “fit” of the representation to 
the external world is not trivial in utility terms. To take an extreme example: suppose a 
person is working all day earning money as a typist. They are faced with a decision as to 
whether carry on working in the job or not. They have two representations: one is realistic 
and results in a decision to carry on working as this is the only way in which the typist can 
support himself. The second representation is fantastical in that it assumes a fairy is going to 
endow the typist with a lot of money so that he doesn’t need to work ever again. While the 
utility from the money acquired in the second representation may be enormous, it would be 
swamped by the expected utility gained from the comparative “fit” of the first representation 
and the typist’s valuation of accuracy9. 
 
7) Representations as moves in a game 
One obvious objection to this framework is that when this is conceptualised as a game 
then one’s opponent cannot see which move has been made as it occurs inside the opponent’s 
head. However there are three possible responses to this objection. The first response is that 
hidden moves are easily modelled in game theory through the use of non-singular 
information sets. The fact that an agent does not know how another agent has moved is easily 
modelled in an extensive form game. It should be noted, however, that it is assumed that all 
9 This does not preclude people from choosing the other way, although one might categorise those who do so 
as “fantasists”. 
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possible representations chosen by the other agent are known even if one does not know the 
specific representation that was chosen. 
The second response is that, for various reasons, the representation chosen will be 
“obvious”. To take an extreme example, a person is unlikely to have a representation that will 
result in him wanting to drinking poison. In other examples, “obviousness” may be culturally 
specific. In China, for example, it is generally assumed that Chinese people are able to use 
chopsticks. In other cases people may consistently have a psychological bias against certain 
things. For example, people tend to find furry animals to be more “cute” than (say) reptiles 
and may be more likely to pet them. 
The third response derives from Frank’s (1988) work on emotions. According to 
Frank, emotions act as signalling devices because they are difficult (although not impossible) 
to fake. If a representation causes emotional arousal in an agent then the other agent may be 
able to detect that emotion and distinguish which representation their opponent has chosen. 
Emotion is costly for the person involved and, being difficult to fake, acts as a commitment 
device that makes the signal reliable. One would expect this method to be used quite often in 
personal interactions. 
Another issue relating to representations as game moves is that of mixed strategies. 
As we have stated above, the principle of minimal rationality states that individuals cannot 
accommodate contradictions within a representation. However, this is part of a general 
psychological finding that agents do not allow explicit contradictions within their reasoning. 
As a result of this, an agent would not be willing to hold two contradictory representations at 
the same time. However, with the traditional interpretation of mixed strategies this is 
precisely what does happen. Given equal expected utilities for representations then one will 
randomise over the two representations even if they have elements in them that contradict 
each other10. 
However, this need not be a major problem in games and mixed equilibria can still be 
used. This is because there are alternative interpretations of the mixed equilibrium concept 
that can be used instead. One alternative interpretation was put forward by Aumann (1987) 
where he interpreted a mixed strategies equilibrium as being a state where players’ subjective 
probabilities were over their opponents’ chances of playing one pure strategy (or 
10 Again, it should be noted here that utilities are simply a measure of preference and are assigned conditional 
on one representation or another. The fact that there may be a contradiction between representations does 
not prevent one from measuring utilities. 
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representation) over another rather than randomising one’s own strategy. Another alternative 
is to follow evolutionary game theory where a mixed strategy is interpreted as the proportions 
of a population who are playing a given pure strategy (or representation). 
Finally, the use of representations automatically implies the use of extensive form 
games rather than normal form games. This is because there is a natural time difference 
between the choosing of a representation and the subsequent choosing of an option from the 
basic game. This is necessary because the choice of a representation informs the 
interpretation of the situation that results in preferences over options in the choice set. 
Representations must be chosen first so that options can be chosen with coherent 
preferences11. It follows from this that we will have a preference for using extensive form 
refinements when looking at equilibrium in these games. 
 
8) Representations, corruption and consent  
Having outlined how representations can be modelled in a game we will need to give 
examples of how this may be done in more concrete situations. Fortunately, as has been 
described, representations can be modelled in much the same way as moves in a game, if one 
allows for the facts that they are largely hidden from opponents and that one cannot use the 
traditional view of mixed strategies.  
Furthermore, we need to link our discussion of representations to the corruption of 
goods. As we have seen, we have rejected the idea that this can be modelled as a modification 
of utility functions. Ultimately, whether a good has certain values is not intrinsic to the good 
itself or to a particular event. Rather, any kind of valuation is a human activity, done as a 
result of humans deciding that one good or event has value rather than another. Any 
corruption of a good therefore is better modelled as a decision by an agent that this good does 
not have the same value as it had before. 
In discussing the modelling of representations we will model three examples derived 
from the discussion in section 2. The examples given will be simple in form but they will 
highlight some of the issues mentioned previously in this paper. The first case is that of 
consent (Peter 2004) where individuals find themselves in a situation where the context has 
11 In the examples later on in this paper, it will sometimes be assumed that agents already have a fixed 
representation or that a move by one’s opponent rigidly determines one’s own representation. This does not 
detract from the point made here. 
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changed while options have not. The example given was of the NHS in the United Kingdom 
and the change from public to private providers of healthcare. We will assume that an exit 
option exists but that a person who disapproves of the change in context may still not use is 
spite of his disapproval. The second case is that of the Swiss nuclear waste repository where 
individuals approve of having a nuclear waste repository without incentives but reject it when 
they have it. The final case relates to bribery and whether a person will accept a bribe or not. 
Case 1 is modelled as follows: the government decides on what sort of service (e.g. 
private or public) is provided for healthcare. There are three possible options (labelled a,b- 
two treatments and e- an exit option) that the second player, an individual consuming the 
country’s health service, can choose.  
 
Figure 1: Healthcare game 
In the diagram above we can see that S1 and S2 represent public and private provision 
of the service respectively. S1 is the “status quo” option in that it is assumed that the service 
has been public for a long time and so the second player’s reaction to this style of service has 
settled down on one active representation. There are two possible representations: R1 and R2. 
R1 is the active representation that is held when public service is continued while R2 is a 
possible alternative representation that holds when private service is imposed. When private 
service is imposed then the second player has to make a choice between the two 
representations and then, conditional on each representation, a choice between the goods 
provided. 
R2 R1 
2 
e 
S2 
a 
b 
S1 
a 
10,10 10,8 0,2 
1 
2 
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b 
20,10
 
20,8 0,2 
e a 
b 
20,t+4 20,t+3 0,t+2 
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It is assumed that the government approves of the change in service and so prefers 
people to have private service rather than public service but doesn’t like it when people exit 
from the service altogether. The individual’s utilities are controlled by the representation they 
have of the situation. We will assume that individuals always prefer treatment a to b and both 
of these to the exit option.  
Under representation R2, player 2 has an addition made to his utility payout of t. This 
represents the “fit” of the representation to the external world. We will normalise the 
corresponding value for R1 to zero. If it is judged that this representation is a good fit then t 
will be high. If t > 6 then a play of (S2,R2,a) becomes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
game. If t < 6 then (S2,R1,a) is subgame perfect. In both cases, whether the service remains 
in the public sector or not, the type of treatment chosen remains the same and from the point 
of view of physical actions there is no difference. 
However, this should not be taken as approval of the system under which treatments 
are provided. If t > 6 under R2 then the amount of utility attached to the treatments has 
actually gone down i.e. the change in system for providing the treatments has “corrupted” 
them. The reason for choosing R2 is because of its perceived fit to the situation (with utility 
of t) not because the goods available look better. However, the individual has not chosen the 
exit option since it still looks like a poor alternative within the game. This, as was stated by 
Peter (2004), does not imply consent. Indeed, if a survey was taken then considerable dissent 
would probably be expressed. This means that “voice” is a necessary part of institutional 
design and we cannot rely on exit options alone to indicate dissent. 
It should also be noted that from the point of view of the outside observer, this game 
would seem to be very simple. If we ignore the change in supplier then the same treatments 
are being produced under public or private provision. One may see this simply as a straight 
choice between two treatments and an exit option. We can also include the government’s 
choice of two types of service but this does not allow us to see the thought processes inside 
an individual’s head. This can only be done with representations. 
Another aspect of this is that, once the individual is in equilibrium, he is in 
equilibrium in both physical actions and in representations. The individual is not free to 
simply change his interpretation of the world at whim because to do so would be to decrease 
his expected utility. Naturally, the individual could acquire another, third, representation but 
this would change the nature of the game by adding another mental action. Nevertheless, this 
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new game could be solved in a similar way and a representation would become fixed in the 
new equilibrium. Allowing for an agent to interpret a situation in a model does not lead to 
theoretical anarchy but instead explains the stability of these interpretations in the form of 
equilibrium representations.  
   Case 2 revolves around the notion that the Swiss state was searching for a nuclear 
waste repository in the village of Wolfenschiessen. In the model, the investigators either offer 
or do not offer money for the villagers to accept the repository. The status quo situation is 
that the villagers are not offered money. In this case they are assumed to subscribe to their 
original representation (labelled R1) and immediately decide whether to accept (A) or decline 
(D) the waste depository. If the villagers are offered money then they make a choice between 
the original representation R1 or a new one, R2. When they have chosen their representation 
then they accept or decline the repository.  
 
 
Figure 2: Nuclear Waste Game 
There are two constants “c” and “t” in the game payoffs above. “c” represents the 
payment to the villagers, while “t” represents the utility change as a result of offering money 
rather than relying on public spiritedness. It should be noted here that the expected utility 
derived from the “fit” of the representations is not assumed to have much impact in this case. 
This would imply that the two representations are seen as equally plausible as a good fit for 
the situation. The main effect of the different representations is to change the balance of 
utility payoffs between A and D. 
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R1 D A 
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21 
 
It follows that the main interest in this model is to decide under what circumstances 
individuals will choose D over A and R2 over R1. Under subgame perfection and assuming 
that money is offered, it can easily be seen that, assuming D is chosen under R2 and A under 
R1 then t>c-5 where c>5. If money is not offered then t>5 for A to be chosen. If the state 
wishes for the repository to be accepted then they will choose not to offer money. Of course, 
depending on the values of t and c, other outcomes are possible. However, such a set-up 
allows us to analyse the situation in detail. 
In a similar manner to case 1, to the outside observer, the decision looks very simple- 
the villagers simply have to choose between accepting the waste depository and rejecting it 
but the use of representations shows that there is actually a rich underlying decision process. 
Also, in the same way as with case 1, the representations are visible to the villager making 
the decision but is not visible to the state so that the state cannot “see” whether one 
representation is chosen or another. 
The final case focuses on the issue of bribery. One can assume in this case that there is a 
judge who has been offered a bribe in order to carry out a particular judicial decision. We will 
model this as a choice by a particular judge as to whether they should see the bribe as a 
commercial transaction (and choose R1) or as a moral issue (in which case they will follow 
R2). It should be noted that we are not assuming absolute morality here. Given enough 
money the judge will be won over or will show weakness of will12. We will also assume, as 
with the second example, that the “fit” of the representations does not affect the outcome in 
this example. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Bribery Game 
12 One way to demonstrate an absolute aversion to corruption would be to have the t utility set at infinity. 
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The choice between R1 and R2 is hidden from the briber and so there is an information set 
covering the starting nodes of the next decision. This is the decision as to whether to bribe the 
judge or not. If it is decided not to bribe the judge then the briber gets a payout of -1, while 
the judge gets a payout of 0 if they are corrupt but t if not corrupt. If a decision is made to 
bribe then the judge has to decide whether to accept the bribe or not. If the judge accepts the 
bribe then he gets a payout of B which is transferred directly from the briber’s payout of 20. 
There is an expected loss k from them being caught which applies to both payouts if the 
judge accepts and only to the briber if the judge refuses. Finally, under representation R2 
there is a utility value t that reduces the utility value of accepting a bribe if offered and boosts 
his utility if it is refused. 
 Obviously this model is highly complex and will have several different outcomes depending 
on the values of k, t and B. Since k is not important in the current analysis, we will fix its 
value at 3. We will likewise fix the value of B at 5 (so that the bribe is sufficiently large to 
exceed the expected costs of being caught) and see what happens when we vary t. It can be 
shown that the briber has a probability p=13/16 where the expected values of bribing and not 
bribing are equal where p is the briber’s subjective probability of the judge deciding to be 
corrupt or not corrupt.  
 At a comparatively high value of t such as t=6 there is one perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
where the judge is not corrupt (i.e, chooses R2) and will not accept a bribe. As a result, no 
bribe is offered with the probability of not offering the bribe at p>13/16 . At t=0 there is no 
difference between the two representations- the judge treats bribes purely as market 
transactions under both representations. As a result, the judge’s choices rely purely on the 
utility, the expected costs of getting caught and the size of the bribe. As a result there are two 
perfect Bayesian equilibria, one under each representation. In both cases the bribe is offered 
and the judge accepts the bribe.  
The final example is when t=2 where there are three perfect Bayesian equilibria. At p<13/16 
the judge is corrupt (choosing R1), is bribed and accept the bribe. Another is a mixed 
strategies perfect Bayesian equilibrium where player 2 is uncertain about player 1’s 
representation, placing a probability of p=13/16 of the judge choosing R1. Player 2 bribes the 
judge and if the judge is not corrupt then the bribe is rejected but is accepted otherwise. The 
final equilibrium is where p>13/16 so the judge is not corrupt and does not accept the bribe, 
with the result that a bribe is not offered. It is interesting that even at low levels of t, it is still 
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possible for the judge to decide not to be corrupt. As can be seen, even with this simple 
model, it is perfectly possible for complex behaviour to emerge. 
 
9) Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the notion of corruption of goods reveals a weakness in economics 
theory that needs to incorporate the notion of a mental representation into discussion of 
decision making. The alternative ideas to this involve modified utility functions or the use of 
types. However, the use of modified utility functions involves the use of mysterious 
psychological parameters that have little grounding in psychological reality and change for 
unknown reasons. Meanwhile the use of types ignores the element of choice involved in 
assessing a situation. 
  I would argue that the use of representations has many positive points in that it incorporates 
the latest research from the cognitive sciences. This means that advances within the cognitive 
sciences in terms of ethics, conceptual learning, framing, decision theory and so on can be far 
more easily incorporated within economics. By accepting the cognitive model of the mind as 
a computer (and aligning with the commonly held folk theory of psychology), economists can 
analyse and solve many problems that before were simply ignored or remained as puzzles. 
The big advantage in using representations is that it is incorporated into game theory 
comparatively easily. There is no need for additional definitions of utility or new equilibrium 
concepts. The examples analysed above used ordinary ideas from game theory such as 
subgame perfect equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There are some restrictions 
on the modelling: one must use extensive form games rather than normal form games and the 
interpretation of mixed strategies are narrower than before. However, this does not detract 
from the overwhelming advantages of using representations. 
 The example that we have used in this paper is that of corruption of goods and it can be seen 
that this is modelled quite successfully through the use of representations. By using ordinary 
game theory one can see exactly how goods come to be corrupted. Essentially they are 
corrupted because they are perceived to be corrupted. A change of situation, whether 
deliberate or otherwise, undermines some of the assumptions that the agent has about the 
value of the good. If this undermining is seen as important i.e. if a representation with the 
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good’s value undermined is seen as a better “fit” or if the choices under the representation are 
better, this representation will succeed over the others. 
This also speaks to the related issue of consent. A person may choose a representation of a 
situation which is a good “fit”. However, this does not necessarily mean that the individual 
likes the choices under this representation more than under another representation where the 
choices are allocated higher utilities. The (expected) utility from the “fit” is equally important 
in determining which representation is adopted. This means that a representation may be 
chosen even though the choices themselves are dominated by the choices under another 
representation. Choices therefore are an inadequate method of determining people’s consent 
to particular choice situations. 
  Representations also provide a tool that can be used in modelling situations where 
interpretation matters. To date in economics, there has been little understanding of situations 
where people change their choices when they are presented in different ways. While some 
progress has been made in terms of negative and positive framing (c.f. prospect theory 
Tversky & Kahneman 1992) there has been little movement beyond that. Representations are 
naturally well suited to modelling interpretation and framing precisely because the content of 
representations is not constrained by the necessity to be self-interested or fully rational. 
Representations can include normative as well as descriptive content and so can, potentially, 
model a wide range of behaviour. 
The models above also provide an answer as to why people tend to widely share particular 
beliefs and desires. These beliefs and desires, incorporated in representations, are in 
equilibrium with the physical choices. As a result they are fixed and remain comparatively 
stable. The introduction of interpretation and representations does not make modelling 
unmanageably heterogeneous but, surprisingly, enforces a considerable degree of uniformity. 
Furthermore, this explains the close links between institutions and behaviour. Given that 
institutions allow or disallow certain types of choice and reward, this influences the 
representations chosen by individuals and creates a uniformity of behaviour within that 
institution.  
   Finally, I would argue that representations are a natural way of looking at the world. The 
folk psychological view is named precisely because that is the view of the world held by 
ordinary human beings. It is perfectly ordinary for humans to attribute reasons to other 
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humans when they take actions and to do that, as has been argued here, is to assume that they 
have representations. 
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